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Alice W. Nichols, Appellee,
V.
STERLING DRUG COMPANY, Inc., a
corporation, Appellant.
No. 14788.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit
Argued Feb. 4, 1971.
Decided June 29, 1971.*
BEFORE WINTER AND CRAVEN, Cmcurr JUDGES, AND MILLER,
DISTRICT JUDGE, CRAVEN, Cmcurr JUDGE:
This is a consolidated interlocutory appeal, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), by two drug manufacturing companies, Cooper Labo-
ratories, Inc. and Sterling Drug Company, Inc., who challenge the
jurisdiction of the District Court of South Carolina to adjudicate
certain claims brought by nonresidents and arising outside the
state. The district court denied the motions of the defendant drug
companies to set aside the service of summons and to dismiss the
complaint. We think the facts presented as a basis for in per-
sonam jurisdiction are insufficient "contacts, ties, or relations"'
to satisfy the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and therefore reverse.
These are diversity jurisdiction cases with the requisite juris-
dictional amount. Both claims stem from alleged injuries suffered
from the consumption of drugs manufactured by defendants. The
drugs were neither manufactured nor consumed in South Caro-
lina.
* 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971).
1. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.
95 (1945).
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Plaintiffs Annie and Henry Ratliff are citizens and residents
of Florida. She purchased the allegedly harmful drugs in Florida
and apparently consumed them there, but, in any event, did not
use them in South Carolina. Defendant Cooper Laboratories, the
maker of the drug used by Mrs. Ratliff, is a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Mystic, Connecticut. Its
activities in South Carolina are limited to solicitation by mail to
dealers and wholesalers, and the mailing of promotional litera-
ture to approximately 650 doctors on its mailing lists.
Plaintiff Alice W. Nichols is a citizen and resident of Indi-
ana, and it has been stipulated that "the drugs referred to in the
Complaint were purchased, consumed and ingested in Indiana
and the injuries and damages complained of occurred in Indiana"
and that "the treatment and hospitalization referred to in the
Complaint occurred in Indiana." Defendant Sterling Drug, a Del-
aware corporation, maintains its principal place of business in
New York where it manufactured the drug taken by plaintiff
Nichols. Sterling Drug's activities in South Carolina, however,
are more extensive than those of Cooper Laboratories. It has filed
application and been given authority to do business in South
Carolina and has appointed an agent for service of process. South
Carolina Code of Laws 12-23.1 through 12-23.16. Additionally,
Sterling maintains five "detail men" who live in South Carolina
and promote Sterling's products through personal contacts with
doctors and drugstores throughout the state. Although occasion-
ally taking orders themselves, it was stipulated that "their pri-
mary responsibility is the promotion of drugs, not the actual salb
of them."
Plaintiffs' only interest in South Carolina is in its relatively
long statute of limitations (six years), and plaintiffs' only contact
with South Carolina is the bringing of these lawsuits for the sole
purpose of availing themselves of that statute-the limitation
periods having run in all other states having any connection with
the claims presented-Florida, Indiana, New York, Connecticut,
and Delaware.
Process was served on Cooper Laboratories pursuant to the
procedures of South Carolina's long-arm statute, South Carolina
Code of Laws 12-23.14, and upon Sterling's agent appointed for
service of process in South Carolina under 12-23.13.2 The suffi-
2. See Rule 4(e) Fed.R.Civ.P.
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ciency of service is not questioned here. However, "underlying the
question of service of process is the preliminary inquiry into
whether the court has the power to summon a defendant before
it to adjudicate a claim against him." 4 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure 205 (1969).
Whether jurisdiction in the sense of power exists depends
upon concepts of "fairness" and "convenience" and not upon
mere compliance with procedural requirements of notice, nor
even corporate "presence" within the state. International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has some-
times been suggested, whether the activity, which the corpora-
tion has seen fit to procure through its agents in another state,
is a little more or a little less .... Whether due process is
satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to in-
sure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corpo-
rate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations ...
Id. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 159.
South Carolina has extended its service of process laws to the
outer limits allowed by International Shoe. See Shealy v. Chal-
lenger Manufacturing Co., 304 F.2d 102, 107 (4th Cir. 1962); Car-
olina Boat & Plastic Co. v. Glascoat Distributors, Inc., 249 S.C.
49, 152 S.E.2d 352 (1967). Our inquiry is therefore limited to a
determination of whether facts in the instant case fall within
those notions of due process,3 i.e., fairness and convenience,
3. "Despite the rather obvious point that the fifth, rather than the fourteenth,
amendment should be the source of due process limitation upon the exercise of federal
court powers, it has generally been assumed that the incorporation of state law to confer
district court amenability embraces state law as limited by federal restraints on the states
themselves. ... Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 9,
38.
"The oft-repeated test is that first stated in Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170
F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1948):
'There are two parts to the question whether a foreign corporation can be
held subject to suit within a state. The first is a question of state law: has the
1973]
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which would make it not unreasonable to require the defendant
corporations to litigate far from home. Are the activities of the
defendant drug companies extensive enough in South Carolina to
warrant in personam jurisdiction when the plaintiffs are nonresi-
dents and the causes of action arose outside the forum and were
unconnected with the defendant's activities in South Carolina?
The question has been said to be one of amenability, Foster,
Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 9, 11,
and the ultimate process one of balancing. Developments in the
Law of State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 924 (1960);
see generally Wright & Miller, supra, at 261-62. Expanding inter-
state commerce and the "transformation of our national economy
over the years" has tended to expand jurisdiction, McGee v. In-
ternational Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2
L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), but there are still limits.
But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the even-
tual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts .... Those restrictions are more than a guarantee
of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respec-
tive States.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238, 2
L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).
Significant in the instant factual setting is the lack of a "ra-
tional nexus" between the forum state and the relevant facts
surrounding the claims presented. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Bird-
song, 360 F.2d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1966). See also, Blount v. Peer-
less Chemicals (P.R.), Inc., 316 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1963); Elliott
v. Edwards Engineering Corp., 257 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D.Colo.
1965). If "plaintiffs injury does not arise out of something done
state provided for bringing the foreign corporation into its courts under the
circumstances of the case presented? There is nothing to compel a state to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation unless it chooses to do so, and
the extent to which it so chooses is a matter for the law of the state as made by
its legislature. If the state has purported to exercise jurisdiction over the foreign
corporation, then the question may arise whether such attempt violates the due
process clause or the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution. U.S.
Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; amend. 14. This is a federal question and, of course,
the state authorities are not controlling. But it is a question which is not reached
for decision until it is found that the State statute is broad enough to assert
jurisdiction over the defendant in a particular situation."'
Id. at 38-39, n. 112.
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in the forum state, then other contacts between the corporation
and the state must be fairly extensive before the burden of de-
fending a suit there may be imposed upon it without offending
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" F.
James, Civil Procedure 640 (1965). (Emphasis added.) See Han-
son v. Denckla, supra, 357 U.S. at 251, 78 S.Ct. 1228; Perkins v.
Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96
L.Ed. 485 (1952); Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen,
360 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1966); von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdic-
tion to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121,
1137-38, 1142-44 (1966).
Here the activities of the defendant corporations in South
Carolina, although possibly sufficient to constitute "presence"
are nonetheless minimal. Neither maintains an office in South
Carolina, and neither warehouses goods there. With the exception
of the samples and materials used by Sterling's detail men, nei-
ther has any real or personal property in the state. Nor does either
maintain a bank account in the state or advertise in directories
there (although advertisements do appear in national medical
journals which subsequently find their way into the state). The
presence of Sterling's detail men in South Carolina and the ap-
pointment of an agent for service of process in accordance with
South Carolina law does not, we think, tip the scale for plaintiff
Nichols. We think the application to do business and the appoint-
ment of an agent for service to fulfill a state law requirement is
of no special weight in the present context. Applying for the privi-
lege of doing business is one thing, but the actual exercise of that
privilege is quite another. See International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, supra, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. 154. The principles of due
process require a firmer foundation than mere compliance with
state domestication statutes.
In respect to the remaining activities of both defendants, and
in particular the activities of Sterling's detail men, we subscribe
to the position taken by the First Circuit in Seymour v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584 (1st Cir. 1970), a case of remarkable
similarity to the one before us. In Seymour, a resident of Massa-
chusetts purchased an allegedly injury-producing drug manufac-
tured by Parke, Davis & Company, a Michigan corporation. None
of the events giving rise to the claims presented occurred in the
forum state, New Hampshire, where the plaintiff admitted she
brought suit because of the expiration of the statute of limitations
1973]
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in Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the claim for lack
of in personam jurisdiction. Affirming, the court of appeals con-
cluded:
If the plaintiff has some attachment to the forum, or if the
defendant has adopted the state as one of its major places of
business, we would have no question of the right of the state to
subject the defendant to suit for unconnected causes of action.
Nor would we even if the forum were not a major center of
defendant's business but were nevertheless a community into
whose business life the defendant had significantly entered as
determined by the quality, substantiality, continuity, and sys-
tematic nature of its activities. . . When, however, defendant's
only activities consist of advertising and employing salesmen to
solicit orders, we think that fairness will not permit a state to
assume jurisdiction. 423 F.2d at 587. (Emphasis added.)
Since neither defendant here was amenable to in personam
jurisdiction in South Carolina, the motions to set aside the service
of process and to dismiss the complaint should have been
granted.
Because we hold the district court lacked jurisdiction, we do
not reach the defendant corporations' second line of de-
fense-that South Carolina's "door-closing" statute (South Caro-
lina Code of Laws 10-214) prevents these nonresident plaintiffs
from maintaining suits on causes of action not arising within the
state. Compare Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320
F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), with Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349
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